A Republican Settlement Theory of the Firm: Applied to Retail Banks in England and the Netherlands (1830-2007) Defended on Thursday, 6 May 2010

The ability to take a leading role in democratic settlements largely shapes a firm’s long term success. A key requirement to occupying such a leading role is the creation of a platform for the execution of democratic principles by customers, shareholders, societal stakeholders, and political actors: the impossibility to dominate others, and the possibility of rivalry and dissent.  After careful analysis of the strategies followed by Dutch and English banks, I conclude that building such a platform implies the development of six strategic abilities.

Internationally, firms’ ability to take a leading role is enabled and constrained by their affiliation with (a) particular nation-state(s); in particular the geopolitical perception of a nation-state’s capacity to express the ideal of popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination. Drawing on an historical analysis of the strategies followed by the Netherlands and England since early modern times, the US and the EU (including the West-German Republic) since WWII, I clarify how nation-state leaders should go about in securing an advantageous geopolitical perception; and in maximising the possibilities of self-determination and success for affiliated firms. 

Keywords

democratisation, settlements, banks, republican, success models, history, rivalry, dissent, freedom of domination, commercial and cooperative, Netherlands, England, analytical dualism