I. (Ingolf) Dittmann

Full Professor
Erasmus School of Economics
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Fellow ERIM
Field: Finance & Accounting
Affiliated since 2005

Ingolf Dittmann is a professor of corporate governance and managerial accounting at the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE).

Professor Dittmann's major areas of interest lie in corporate finance, corporate governance, executive compensation and behavioural finance.

He is a member of both ERIM and the Tinbergen Institute.

He currently chairs the research project 'Explaining Stock Options in Executive Compensation', financed by a vidi grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).

Earlier career roles include that of visiting scholar at the University of California in San Diego.

Professor Dittman received his PhD from Dortmund University and his Habilitation (a second German degree) from Humboldt-University at Berlin.

Key Publications (5)

  • Dittmann, I. (2008). The Structure and Level of Executive Pay. Oratie (2008, januari 16). Rotterdam: Erasmus Universiteit.
Dan Zhang

Essays in Executive Compensation

  • Role: Promotor
  • PhD Candidate: Dan Zhang
  • Time frame: 2008 - 2012

CEO compensation and envy of rank-and-file workers

We want to establish from the time series of CEO pay and rank-and-file worker pay whether the latter are inequality averse. To what extent do these worker preferences affect CEO compensation?

Here, we will test whether rank-and-file workers experience disutility from the gap between their own pay and the CEO’s pay. To this end, we will construct a unique panel dataset that includes the wages of all employees (including the CEO) for a sample of large German firms. Moreover, we will use a model of CEO and worker compensation to estimate the parameters of the worker’s utility function. If we can indeed detect inequality aversion, executive compensation is much more complicated than previously thought, because it is not enough to only take into account the interests of the principal (shareholders) and those of the agent (the CEO). This finding will encourage more research on relative pay and how firms can affect their employees’ framing in a way that their disutility from the pay gap becomes small. Moreover, our estimates of workers’ preferences will contribute markedly to the literature on inequality aversion in microeconomics and labour economics.

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2014
June
06
ERIM Research Workshop
2011
May
16
2011
April
13
2010
May
17
2009
May
27
ERIM Research Seminar
2009
January
16
ERIM Inaugural Address Research in Management Series
2008
June
23
ERIM Research Seminar
2008
June
03
2008
May
27
2008
April
22
2008
April
08
2008
April
01
2007
December
12
2007
December
04
2007
November
27
2007
October
30
2007
October
09
2007
October
02
2007
May
08
ERIM Research Seminar
2007
April
18
2007
March
27
ERIM Research Seminar
2007
March
13
ERIM Research Seminar
2007
March
12
2006
December
19
ERIM Research Seminar
2006
November
28
2006
October
17
2006
October
10
2006
September
26
2006
September
19
2006
September
12
  • ERIM Top Article Award (2008)

    Details


Address

Visiting address

Office: Tinbergen Building H14-23
Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
3062 PA Rotterdam

Postal address

Postbus 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Latest publication

Dittmann, I., Kübler, D., Maug, E. & Mechtenberg, L. (2014). Why votes have a value? Games and Economic Behavior, 84, 17-38.