Auditors & Decision Aids: The Effect of Litigation Risk and Internal Control Risk on Decision Aid Reliance & Decision Confidence
Abstract
The purpose of the current study is to examine how litigation risk and internal control
risk affect auditors reliance on decision aid recommendations. This is a particularly
relevant question in the Sarbanes-Oxley era, as decision aids hold the potential to
improve audit quality; yet, immense legal and regulatory pressures on audit firms to
improve audit quality could lead to a check list mentality where auditors subordinate
their audit judgments to decision aid recommendations. Based on an experiment
involving 118 audit practitioners, we find that auditors rely more on decision aid
recommendations when either litigation risk or internal control risk is high relative to
low. When litigation risk and internal control risk are simultaneously high, there is an
interactive effect on decision aid reliance. The experimental design incorporates an
unrealistic recommendation from the decision aid and, disturbingly, when both risks are
high, the auditors appear to deferentially follow the decision aids advice. The main and
interaction effect patterns for decision confidence are directionally opposite from
decision aid reliancean unexpected finding. Analyses of cognitive response items
suggest that, despite low confidence in their final decisions, participants who display
relatively high reliance believe that using and relying on the aid would help them defend
their judgments in a court of law. Post-experimental analyses reveal that fairly low
reliance on decision aids in practice is mainly due to uncertainty surrounding the
accuracy of decision aids and lack of refresher training on decision aid use.