Managerial Ownership and Bank Risk Taking
Speaker
Jan Bouwens
Tilburg School of Economics and Management,
Tilburg University
Add
Add to Calendar
Abstract
This paper examines the relation between managerial ownership and risk taking by banks for a large sample of international financial institutions. We assess theories concerning conflicts between managers and owners over risk taking behavior. We argue that managerial risk taking of bank managers is mitigated when they are provided with equity incentives. Our results suggest that this is the case for managers that hold a relatively low percentage (< 10%) of the total shares. Managerial equity incentives may therefore serve as a risk reduction instrument. That is, in order to reduce the bank’s default risk, bank manag ers’ interests should not necessarily be aligned with the interest of the outside shareholder. |
Related events
Thu. 25 Apr. 2024
Research Seminar
You’ve Got a Chatbot Friend in Me: Do Generative AI Chatbots Improve the Quality of Auditors’ Voice Decisions?
Kathryn Kadous
(Emory University)
Thu. 2 May. 2024
Research Seminar
Does Disclosure Prominence Affect Firm Activities? Tax Planning Responses to Tax-Related Disclosure Deregulation
Brad Hepfer
(The University of Iowa)
Information
- Type
- Research Seminar
- Programme
- Finance & Accounting
- Date
- Thu. 1 Nov. 2012
- Time
- 11:30 - 13:00
- Location
- Mandeville Building T3-42
Coordinators
Felix Lamp
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE),
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM),
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Related events
Thu. 25 Apr. 2024
Research Seminar
You’ve Got a Chatbot Friend in Me: Do Generative AI Chatbots Improve the Quality of Auditors’ Voice Decisions?
Kathryn Kadous
(Emory University)
Thu. 2 May. 2024
Research Seminar
Does Disclosure Prominence Affect Firm Activities? Tax Planning Responses to Tax-Related Disclosure Deregulation
Brad Hepfer
(The University of Iowa)