Executive Compensation


The financial crises has revived a heated debate on executive compensation that centers around the question whether executive pay is efficient, i.e. in the best interest of the companies. Many features of executive compensation, like high and increasing pay packages, large option holdings, and generous severance pay, are often cited as proof that current compensation practice and corporate governance is deeply flawed. In many cases, however, the scientific literature has been able to provide economic answers why seemingly inefficient pay arrangements might nevertheless be efficient.

This one-day workshop brings together leading scholars in the field of Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance. It starts around 8:30am on Friday, June 6th, 2014 and ends with a dinner.


Participation is free of charge, but advance registration is required. Click here for the registration form. The number of participants is limited and you may be placed on a waiting list.

Invited speakers

Confirmed invited speakers include:

  • Renée Adams (University of New South Wales)
  • Cláudia Custódio (Arizona State University)
  • Alex Edmans (London Business School)
  • Rüdiger Fahlenbrach (École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne)
  • Miguel Ferreira (Nova School of Business and Economics)
  • Ernst Maug (University of Mannheim)
  • Laura Starks (University of Texas at Austin)
  • David Yermack (New York University)