Preemption Through Non-disclosure
Speaker
Jing Li
The University of Hong Kong
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Abstract
An informed bidder can voluntarily disclose his private information on the value of an auctioned asset to rival bidders and the seller. We examine the informed bidder's optimal disclosure policy and the esulting consequences on the seller's payoff. We show that the informed bidder strategically withholds information to create a winner's curse for rival bidders, which has a preemptive effect on the rival's articipation. Taking into account this strategic response, we show that increased competition among bidders may reduce the seller's payoff - a surprising result that is contrary to the common belief that bidder competition generally increases the seller's payoff.
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Information
- Type
- Research Seminar
- Programme
- Finance & Accounting
- Date
- Thu. 27 Sep. 2018
- Time
- 11:10 - 12:30
- Location
- M3-04
Contact
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE),
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Coordinator
Erasmus School of Economics (ESE),
Erasmus University Rotterdam
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April
05
Fri. 5 Apr. 2024
Research Workshop
Erasmus Accounting Workshop
Matthew Bloomfield
(University of Pennsylvania)
Emily Griffith
(University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Ryan Sommerfeldt
(Washington State University)
Jeremy Michels
(Purdue University)