Strategic Open Routing in Service Networks


Andrew Frazelle
Andrew Frazelle
  • Speaker
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University

Event Information

Type
Research Seminar
Programme
Logistics
Date
Thu. 7 Dec. 2017
Contact
Carmen Meesters-Mirasol
Time
12:30-13:30
Location
T03-42


Abstract

We study the behavior of strategic customers in an open-routing service network with multiple stations. When a customer enters the network, she is free to choose the sequence of stations that she visits, with the objective of minimizing her expected total system time. For the two-station game with deterministic service times, we prove that the game is supermodular. By applying the supermodularity result, we observe that strategic customers "herd," i.e., in equilibrium all customers choose the same route. We then identify a broad class of learning rules---which includes both fictitious play and Cournot best-response---that converges to herding in finite time.  We also find that the herding behavior is prevalent in many other open-routing service networks, including those with stochastic service times and those with more than two stations.

Ioannis Fragkos
  • Coordinator