Maximal covering location games: an application for the coast guards


Speaker


Abstract

In this talk, we focus on maximal covering location games. In these games, there are several players that each may or may not own a single resource. Players can cooperate by pooling these resources. It is assumed that a resource covers all players located within a certain radius from the resource. Coverage of a player by (at least) one resource results into a player-specific profit. Aim of the players is to position the resources in such a way that the joint profit (i.e., the sum of the profits of the covered players) is maximized. It is known that these games are super additive, monotonic, and, under some conditions, may have non-empty cores. We discuss a new sufficient condition for core non-emptiness of maximal covering location games, which also a has practical interpretation when dealing with a real-life application of our studied game, namely pooling of coast guard boats.

 

Registration to Remy Spliet, spliet@ese.eur.nl is required for availability of lunch.