Aggressive Reporting and Probabilistic Auditing in a Principles-Based Environment
We analyse the reporting strategies of firms and the investigation strategies of auditors in an archetype principles-based financial reporting system. To this end, we add a verification stage to a standard cheap-talk game, and apply the resulting game to financial reporting. We show that for a principles-based system to work properly, firms should bear a sufficient share of the cost of a thorough investigation. Furthermore, we find that a principles-based system is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, it leads to a plausible investigation strategy of the auditor, in which “suspected” reports receive most attention. On the other hand, a principles-based system only indirectly weakens firms’ incentives to report aggressively.
This seminar is organised by the Erasmus Accounting Research Group.
- Research Seminar
- Finance & Accounting
- Thu. 28 Nov. 2013
- 11:30 - 13:00
- Mandeville Building T03-42